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CRISIS
One of the revelations of Eastern Europe has been the 
resilience of local and ethnic identity after the breakup of 
communism. Not for the first time, the language o f 'class' 
has come off second best. Colin M ercer argues that the 
politics of identity is undergoing a resurgence worldwide.
A relationship between 'politics' and 'identity7 has been central to the work­ing of modem forms of government 
since at least the beginning of the 19th 
century. It is basic to the ways in which the 
modem polity works that some sort of contrac­
tual relationship should be established between 
an individual identity, whether of subject, 
citizen, comrade, welfare recipient, householder 
or victim - or any combination of these - and the 
general arrangement and apparatus of govern­
ment There is nothing new about the politics of 
identity, notwithstanding the ways in which 
this expression seems to be enjoying an ascen­
dancy in some Left or 'post-Left' thinking.
This contemporary interest is related to the need 
rethink political constituencies, alignments, forms of 
anisation, affiliation and processes. It concerns thinkinj 
Deyond class' and beyond the political and theoretics 
references of both a received marxism and a traditional 
abourism. The politics of identity is markedly a product 
of the 'seventies, of the New Left and of the new political 
logics sketched out by feminism, and the gay and black 
liberation movements which extended the meanings of 
politics and democracy to include issues of identity and 
culture. The slogan and principle 'the personal is political' 
provided the logic for this politics of identity. But this 
principle brings with it some pretty substantial problems.
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What started out as a useful agitational slogan and political 
emphasis was fused into a way of resolving, through an 
act of will, conflicts between the public and private 
spheres. This, according to Sheila Rowbotham, had nega­
tive consequences:
Because the political was fused with the personal, 
and because there were no external structures and 
form ally elected leaders, there were no 
mechanisms for distancing feelings of hurt, 
betrayal and anger, and the movement fractured.
Nonetheless, the emphases and new ways of thinking 
produced by the proposition that the personal is political 
served to return to tne agenda something that had been 
either forgotten or displaced: that the 'borders' between 
politics and personal identity formed by family life, eth­
nicity, lifestyle orientations and a range of other factors 
relating to our 'subjectivity' or sense of self are so porous 
as not to be borders at all. Child care is an example of this 
tangle of lines and one where it would clearly be un-
31 rproductive to say categorically that this set of espon- 
...... ........................public domain and this set in thea esibilities lies in the pub rivate. As with housework, or domestic and community ealth and hygiene, the demarcations will remain a matter 
of political calculation rather than being enshrined forever 
in a balance sheet of public and private responsibilities. So, 
the personal is political but there is little to be gained from 
repeating this as a mantra until due attention has been paid 
to the detail of the democratic mechanisms which are 
necessary to realise and exploit its implications.
This is the 'governmental' side to the relationship be­
tween the personal and the political which establishes a
ALR :JULY 1990
FEATURES 21
relationship between private individuals and the public 
state. There is another dimension of this relationship which 
results from the fact that we live not just in any old state 
but in a particular nation state. This aspect of the relation­
ship between the personal and the political which we 
might call 'cultural has recently been dramatically high­
lighted in an international reminder of the persistence and 
importance of the politics of identity.
Ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan, Poles in Lithuania and 
the Ukraine, Hungarians in Romania, Germans in Poland, 
Albanians and Slovenians in Yugoslavia in the wake of the 
Gorbachev reforms attest, in a worst-case scenario to a 
resurgence of m itteleuropean, Baltic and Balkan 
nationalisms of an ugly hue. More dispassionately, they 
can be characterised as the failure of a marxism in theory 
and in governance to recognise and come to terms with the 
politics of identity in its most resilient form: ethnicity. 
While at a purely formal and legal level Stalin and his 
successors may have settled the 'nationalities question', it 
is absolutely clear that the profound ethnic substrata of 
these 'nations' remained untouched. In fact, they were 
untouchable by a doctrine whose fundamental category of 
identity and classification remains that of class.
These two aspects of the politics of identity are closely 
related. Your identity as a member of a family, for example, 
or as a citizen holding a passport, is not a purely abstract 
or legal matter. Both the family and citizenship are overlain 
and defined by layers of national-cultural affiliation. Ideas 
concerning behaviour, values, dispositions, and even size, 
mark out what is to be understood as a typically 
Australian, Vietnamese or Italian family. The manners and 
mores of family life are often the most difficult things that
a student of languages has to learn. The legal identity 
offered by citizenship is usually related to ideas about 
national character reproduced in literature, histories and 
the print and electronic media. National identity and char­
acter retain a strong currency in Australia and the in­
evitable and very boring metaphors of the Bush and the 
Bushman will keep cropping up in movies and public 
debate.
So, the politics of identity is real, historical and integral 
to the development of modem nation-states. Where does 
this lead us? First to the recognition that the politics of 
identity has a long history which is dense, resilient and 
complex. Second, to the recognition that the politics of 
identity involves definite forms and mechanisms - politi­
cal, administrative, cultural, linguistic, historical - which 
enable identities to be formed, secured and reproduced. 
We need to say, in other words, that, yes, the personal is 
political in a very general sense but the job now is to 
differentiate the slogan and to 'un'- or de-fuse the two 
terms; and to ask more particular and discrete questions 
about how, why, in what terms and through which proces­
ses and mechanisms the personal gets linked to the politi­
cal.
A recent example from Eastern Europe might serve as a 
starting point. Ethnic Poles in the Ukraine are, on the 
whole, a very religious community. They share with many 
Ukrainians a profound historical adherence to the Churcn 
and they attend the same churches for worship. After the 
Mass has been celebrated, however, the Poles often stay 
behind in order to celebrate Mass again, this time in their 
own language and with their own ethnic or national icons. 
The performance of this ritual, the language in which it is
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performed and the icons deployed matter a great deal to 
ethnic Poles.
There are three factors here which are important in 
offering, securing and reproducing social identity. First, 
there is the role of the Church in providing religious prac­
tices which, while theoretically international, nonetheless 
provide a distinctive and tangible 'home' for proto-nation­
al and ethnic sentiments. The Catholic Church has histori­
cally been very good at the adaptation of distinctive 
regional ethnic and national icons and practices to its own 
liturgy.
Second, there is the fact that we are dealing here with a
ives a 
who
participate in it. The performance of the religious ritual - 
not so very far down the spectrum from attendance at 
political party meetings ana rallies - doubles here as a 
simultaneous affirmation of daily ethnic existence. You 
know, more or less, who will be at the meeting, that they 
will be performing gestures and saying things and offering 
respects to icons m the same way as 
you and in the same language. As 
Pascal once said, there is no need for 
a programmatic theory of religious 
belief: you kneel, you pray and there­
fore believe. In this case you perform 
these practices, recognise the icons, 
believe in God and participate in the 
general communion of Catholic 
Christendom but you know also that 
you are doing this at a particular time 
and place and simultaneously con­
firming an ethnicity or other sense of 
'belonging'. Ritual practices are im­
portant in securing and reproducing 
social identity.
and what is known by British linguists as Received Stand­
ard Pronunciation. This linguistic strategy has mattered a 
great deal in Australian political and cultural history since 
the late 1960s in the elaboration of a political culture and 
identity at a calculated distance from the 'Old Country'. It 
matters more intensely when, within the same state, you 
have divergent languages which are geographically con­
centrated, linked to social status and identified as a social 
and cultural bloc
Another example from daily and routine existence: food 
and eating. Eating, including access to a viable market of 
appropriate commodities and forms of preparation is, like 
religious ritual and language, a social and cultural marker
"That the 
personal is 
political is 
glaringly 
obvious but 
offers no
ana classifier and, like language and ritual, can lead to 
dramatic forms of conflict. In Bradford, in the north of 
England, at the moment there is an uneasy political and 
cultural truce over eating. This is between the laige Mus­
lim community for whom the Halal method of animal 
slaughter and preparation is essential to the practice of 
their religion, and bodies like the RSPCA and animal 
welfare groups to whom this practice of slaughter is bar­
barous. In such a situation of an in­
tense politics of identity, one can im­
agine that the proposition that the 
personal is political won't get you 
very far since it is glaringly obvious 
but offers no answers.
Third, there is the matter of lan­
guage. This is a profound historical 
and cultural index of ethnicity and, 
for that matter, of any form of sub-cultural identity. The 
language of political meetings again springs to mind. Lan­
guage makes you a 'member' of a community, culture or 
sub-culture insofar as it gives you a visible and audible 
mark of adherence and affiliation. It is one of the most 
obvious ways along, perhaps, with dress, that marks you 
out as a 'foreigner and it has been one of the primary 
objects of legislation for governments which nave at­
tempted to deal with the 'national question' since the
answers.
beginning of the nineteenth century. 'Unity of idiom is 
unity of the Revolution' said one of the key legislators of 
Revolutionary France in 1796. The fate of Gaelic in Scot­
land and Ireland, Welsh in Wales, Cornish in England, 
Breton and Proven^ale in France, and the hundreds of 
indigenous languages of Australia tell their own story in 
this regard. Language identifies, defines, includes and 
excludes more immediately and more dramatically than 
“ r cultural practice. At a less dramatic but no
less historical and resilient level, consider the role of 
Australian dialectical forms, the vocabulary, syntax, in­
tonation and general organisation of 'strine in its critical 
relationship to those forms of identity and affiliation of­
fered by the 'Queen's English'. After Menzies, no 
Australian prime minister could conceivably slip back into 
the bad old obsequious ways of fully rounded vowel tones
Of course the personal is political, 
will say the local Labour Councillor 
who happens to be a devout Muslim. 
That is why my access to food 
prepared in accordance with Islamic 
doctrine is an issue, being fundamen­
tal to my personal lifestyle and 
religious preferences. Of course it is, 
will come the response from a mem­
ber of the same Labour Party branch 
who also belongs to Animal Libera­
tion and is committed to multicul- 
turalism. That is why it is absolutely 
justifiable for me to resist these practices in order to protect 
Doth animals and my own deeply felt humane sentiments 
about their treatment and place in the order of things.
The arguments could be multiplied in relation to dress, 
gender, sexual orientation and preference, and so on. The 
politics of identity produces a multitude of new problems 
which are not resolved by the old solidarities, forms of 
allegiance and logics which characterise traditional politi­
cal organisations. But it is not worth being too triumphalist 
about this. The politics of identity is not, as some ad vocates 
of post-Fordism, postmodernism and 'New Times' seem 
to suggest, a liberated zone of daylight into which we are 
now emerging after the dark age of the blue-collar worker 
and the factory system. It has been around at least as long 
as them although obscured by a political choice which 
preferred one form of identity over others.
What the agenda of the politics of identity calls for is not 
the triumphant affirmation of a 'new reality7 because it is, 
after all, not so new. And there is no point either, in the 
hundred flowers' mode, of simply celebrating the emergence 
and proliferation of 'democratic identities'. Not all identities 
are democratic and there is no reason why we should expect 
them to be. Rather than romantic affirmation, what is needed
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is a way of posing the question of the relationship between 
democracy and identity, between the political and the 
personal, which takes into account the sorts of tensions and 
conflicts mentioned above over ethnidty, religion, lan­
guage, eating and those other multiple goods ana services, 
commodities and daily activities wnich define and shape 
the substance of people's daily lives.
These dimensions of the plurality and complexity of the 
personal/political relationship are not well-met, either, by 
the sort of political romantiasm with distinctively anti-
gU(
the
democratic implications which, as Sheila Rowbotham ar- 
jes, was one of the outcomes of the 1970s argument that 
le personal is political. The theory was
...that by politidsing all aspects of life it would be 
possible to bring democratic relationships into 
Deing. Only when this split (of the per­
sonal/political) was overcome could political par­
ticipation be 'self-actualising' and integrate 
women as whole people.
In effect, she says, this fusion only 
served to construct new boundaries. 
One obvious negative outcome of this 
politidsation of everything and the 
failure to differentiate between the 
different levels and complexities of 
the personal/political relationship 
was a tendency which all on the Left, 
hopefully uncomfortably, will recog­
nise: to lay daim to a sententious 
jurisdiction over political and moral 
and ethical life as a whole. This was 
possible since everything was politi­
cal and the moral and the ethical were 
simply analogous and transparent 
domains.
The problem with this easy inter­
pretation is the degree of 
'transparency' it assumes Detween, 
say, sexual relations of power and other forms of social 
power. There are, of course, connections but they are not 
always so easy to make and they are certainly not automat­
ic  Things get in the way; things like external democratic 
mechanisms v e s t e d c :1" 1 1 iU! 
like
nature ot the family
These too are the components of a politics of identity but 
they have not been well-addressed by the 
'psychologisation' of the personal/political relationship. 
The problem here has been the assumption that the real 
and experienced demarcation between the personal and 
the political, the private and the public is actually a 'split' 
which needs in some way to be needed, resolved or over­
come. This is a classic Romantic conception of the world. 
First, organise the world into those things that are as- 
sodated with unreason, feeling, imagination, spontaneity,
“Identities and 
personalities are 
multiple. This is 
not a  
postmodernist 
credo or a  
problem”
But it is a pity, from the point of view of both pluralism 
and the recognition of democratic mechanisms, that the 
demarcation between personal and political, private and 
public, has to be thought of in this way. Why think of this 
demarcation as 'split'? It seems to me, on the contrary, that 
the relationship between the personal and the political or 
the domain of identity and the domain of government is 
not at all characterised by splits and divisions but rather 
by historically variable forms of alliance. Social identities 
are secured and reproduced by establishing a relationship 
between a specific sense of self and a range of institutions, 
everyday practices, commodities, objects and rituals - 
families, schools, communities, workplaces, the market, 
meat, dothing, shopping, styles of eating, religious and 
quasi-religious rituals, leisure activities, political parties 
and so on - which we might call the 'material culture of 
everyday life'. This, after all, is what most people's ex­
perience of politics and the issues that matter is all about.
One of the consequences of this complex set of alliances 
is that people are not 'whole' or 'full' or 'actualised' iden­
tities, but a combination, to a greater or lesser extent, of a 
whole range of partial identities 
determined by their everyday prac­
tices, rituals, affiliations and relation­
ships to other people, objects and 
commodities. This indudes, obvious­
ly and importantly, a dass-relation­
ship and access to the purchase of 
objects and the uses of them in dis­
tinctive lifestyle patterns but this is 
only one powerful relationship 
among others. A politics of identity 
should, therefore,be about recognis­
ing and engaging with the wnole 
complex extent of this array of prac­
tices rather than either the realisation 
of the whole person or the incarcera­
tion of that person into a single affilia­
tion.
transcending this split and by this means shall ye reach the 
threshold of liberation. It is i jssible, of course, to n
etc. Then draw up a program for recondling and
‘ 5U "  "  ..........................
LSDOSS
a certain traditional distribution of male and fe 
tributes under these headings and possible also to recog­
nise how a post-Freudian logic might lend credence to this 
idea of a split. This is no acddent.
recognise 
male at-
Identities and personalities are 
multiple. This is not a postmodernist credo or a 'problem' 
which needs a Freudian cure. The multiple nature of sodal 
identity is a basic and operational prindple of modem 
forms of government, the aims of which have been, to put 
it simply, to orchestrate identities under an umbrella of 
national affiliation or dtizenship.
On II Pluvifise, Year II in the French revolutionary calen­
dar (January 31,1796), a man who might be said to have 
inaugurated the politics of identity in its most coherent 
form - the Abb6 Gr6goire - advised one of the Chambers of 
the French National Assembly that
When one reconstructs a government anew, it is 
necessary to republicanise everything. The legis­
lator who ignores the importance of signs will fail 
at his mission; he should not let escape any oc­
casion for grabbing hold of the senses, for 
awakening republican ideas. Soon the soul is 
penetrated by the objects constantly in front of its 
eyes; and this combination, of facts, of emblems 
which retraces without cease for the dtizen his 
rights and his duties; this collection forms in a 
manner of speaking, the republican mold which
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gives him a national character and the demeanour 
of a free man.
This logic of government - one which establishes, as a 
condition of its existence, a social identity who is simul­
taneously national, free and republican - is not so arcane. It is 
a logic which is not very far from a recent experience in 
Australia. Think back a couple of years to the 1988 Bicen ten-
community and daily 
preferred images of a national landscape and the configura­
tions of a national character and you come up with a continu­
ing rather than a one-off Bicentennial and celebratory logic
Bicentenaries and other, more regular, forms of spec­
tacular national celebration, rehearse, albeit in accelerated 
and condensed ways, a politicisation of the stuff of 
everyday life and demonstrate the persistence and impor­
tance of the relationship between the 'personal' and the
'political'. This is transacted and negotiated through the 
central category of the citizen which is contractually re­
lated both to the state and the apparatus of government 
and of the nation and the less formal cultural accretions of 
national identity, or, even more informally, that 'sense of 
belonging' and 'sense of place' which have such a central 
role in Australian political and cultural history.
Where do these senses and this texture of a distinctive 
everyday life get elaborated and consolidated? In institu­
tions like the family, the school, the workplace and the pub, 
ng, worshipping, rallying, watchin] 
the television and reaain
In practices like eati
newspapers and other forms oi 
literature. In forms of behaviour like dress, language and 
other forms of 'self-presentation'. In the print and 
electronic media, in icons and emblems and government 
documents and in forms of local, regional and national 
celebration. Everywhere, in fact
This is the hard and compacted ground of a politics of
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identity. It is compacted and therefore complex because it 
is the accumulated result of a long process of securing a 
resilient relationship between 'people', 'nation' and 'state'. 
The objective of this politics of identity would be the 
consolidation, progressively at arm's length and in increas­
ingly negotiated ways, of 'manageable' and preferred 
forms of social identity. The nation becomes, in this con­
text, a time (with a specific and identifiable and 
'meaningful' history), a place (with demarcated borders 
but, more importantly, a distinctive sense of place, land 
and landscape) and, for want of a better term, a lifestyle 
(with distinctive ways of living, manners, customs and 
behaviours which are peculiar to this time and place, this 
nation and no other).
These forms of social identity have been amassed under 
the general category of citizenship. And what is crucial 
about this category and the ways in which it has developed
- and which give it a significant potential in rethinking the 
contemporary politics of identity - is that it is not a purely 
legal-constitutional definition. To be effective in holding 
together multiple possible forms of identity, citizenship 
has depended crucially on its interconnections with a 
whole network of cultural identifications and points of 
reference.
These have been secured through popular education, 
through the development of the print and electronic media, 
through the histories, literatures and reports dealing with 
the preferred attributes of national character and other 
forms of training in 'personal', 'cultural' and 'dvic' at­
titudes. Citizenship is, in this sense, much more than 
having your name entered on a register of births or making 
an oath at a naturalisation ceremony. It involves entry into
- and forms of affiliation with - a cultural network of 
institutions, identifications and practices from the British 
monarchy right down to the backyard barbie.
Which brings us to the rub. If the politics of identity and 
the politics of the personal are inextricably tied up with the 
politics of citizenship, what then?
Bertrand Russell once advised in a rather squeaky and 
imperious way that every democrat should have what he 
called 'a portion of the governmental mentality'. This point 
is well taken but we would need to tread carefully here to 
avoid another regime of sententious moralising which 
might rival the worst aspects of 'the personal is political' 
push and produce another Jacobin Terror of invigilation 
and condemnation. The question of citizenship is far better 
approached not simply from its dvic, constitutional or 
governmental dimensions but rather from the range of 
related identities which have accumulated around i t  These 
are its more resilient and complex dimensions and they 
indude questions of ethnirity, of gender identification, of 
religious and political affiliation, of being a member of an 
indigenous or ethnic community. These forms of affiliation 
are often the fundamental medium which determine our 
relationship to government.
To say that the dtizen is a white bourgeois male with a 
single ethnic affiliation is probably overstating it a bit but 
not too much. The birth of the dtizen in the late eighteenth 
century was in the context of a certain relationship to 
property rights, a certain legal dassification of the in­
dividual, a certain definition of gender and a certain sense 
of a homogeneous national culture. Some countries, notab­
ly the UK, are busily reinventing these initial constraints 
in order to deal with problems like Hong Kong and local 
government finandng in the explidt name of the 'active 
dtizen'. This indicates some of the problems associated 
with the inherited concept of the dtizen, the fart that it is, 
for large sections of the population, through gender, ine­
quality of income and educational opportunity, only ever 
a partial dtizenship. But while signalling its limitations, 
these factors also indicate the potential of a politics of 
dtizenship when elaborated in terms of a more general 
politics or identity.
The politics of dtizenship means, in this context, a 
politics which would enable us to coherently address ques­
tions of social and economic justice, of access to the market 
defined not in purely economic terms but rather in terms 
of quality of life, of rights of access to and partidpation in 
sodal and natural environments and the custodianship or 
stewardship of them. The politics of dtizenship offers a 
strategic way of addressing those nitty-gritty components 
of lifestyle' - how people get dothed, fed and live - by 
recognising that these are simultaneously 'economic' ques­
tions of resource allocation and distribution and 'cultural' 
questions of identity and quality of life.
There are, of course, the legal and constitutional dimen­
sions of dtizenship which would enable this reworked 
politics of identity to be firmly rooted in due legal process 
and the governmental domain. This is important in order 
to prevent it from being romantidsed into the ether of 
personal or even group liberation.
The politics of identity, when thought of in terms of 
dtizenship, is not about the celebration of the 'exceptional' 
identities assoaated with race, ethnidty or gender. Rather, 
it is about enabling access to sodal justice in those institu­
tions and practices of everyday life like domestic organisa­
tion, work, schooling, the market, the environment and the 
community which is where identities get constructed and 
mobilised in the first place.
Citizenship is about rights, entitlements and duties and 
all of these have been given distinctive new profiles on the 
political agenda by feminism, anti-radsm, the environ­
mental movement and various campaigns on social justice 
and policy. It would be a pity to lose these profiles for want 
of a political logic which is able to address them together, 
strategically and coherently. Two hundred years after its 
first formulation the concept of dtizenship may, in the 
context of the porosity of national borders, the reality of 
multiculturalism and the new politics of identity, be ready 
for a transformed existence.
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